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Abstract
Studies of political dynamics between multinational enterprise (MNE) parents
and subsidiaries during subsidiary role evolution have focused largely on control
and resistance. This paper adopts a critical discursive approach to enable an
exploration of subtle dynamics in the way that both headquarters and
subsidiaries subjectively reconstruct their independent-interdependent relation-
ships with each other during change. We draw from a real-time qualitative study
of a revealing case of charter change in an important European subsidiary of an
MNE attempting to build closer integration across European country operations.
Our results illustrate the role of three discourses – selling, resistance and
reconciliation – in the reconstruction of the subsidiary–parent relationship. From
this analysis we develop a process framework that elucidates the important role
of these three discourses in the reconstruction of subsidiary roles, showing how
resistance is not simply subversive but an important part of integration. Our
findings contribute to a better understanding of the micro-level political
dynamics in subsidiary role evolution, and of how voice is exercised in MNEs.
This study also provides a rare example of discourse-based analysis in an MNE
context, advancing our knowledge of how discursive methods can help to
advance international business research more generally.
Journal of International Business Studies (2011) 42, 765–786.
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INTRODUCTION
Subsidiary role evolution results from a combination of external
forces, such as parent multinational enterprise (MNE) strategy, and
the way subsidiary managers choose to respond (Birkinshaw &
Hood, 1998a; Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009; Birkinshaw, Young, &
Hood, 2005; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a,b). Strategies designed to
meet the challenges of an evolving global environment require new
forms of organizing that depend on more MNE integration (Bartlett
& Ghoshal, 1993; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). The resulting alteration
to the degree of subsidiary autonomy disturbs the independence–
interdependence balance of the MNE–subsidiary relationship, and
is likely to engender a range of micro-political behaviors (Andersson,
Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Boussebaa, 2009; Mudambi & Navarra,
2004; Tempel, Edwards, Ferner, Muller-Camen, & Wa ¨chter, 2006).
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aligned with those of the MNE, since headquarters–
subsidiary relationships are a mixed-motive dyad
(Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007; Boussebaa, 2009).
However, little is known about the political negotia-
tion processes between an MNE and its subsidiaries.
Studies that have addressed political dynamics have
largely pursued a view of power in which the focus is
on control and resistance, and the outcomes are
perceived in terms of winning or losing (Clark &
Geppert, 2011). We argue it is important to move
beyond analysis of control and resistance to better
comprehend the subtle and nuanced dynamics
through which both headquarters (HQ) and subsidi-
aries reconstruct their independent-interdependent
relationships during times of change. To address this
research gap, we study subsidiary role evolution
through a discursive perspective. We argue that a
critical discursive approach (Fairclough, 2003; Phillips
& Hardy, 2002; Phillips, Sewell, & Jaynes, 2008)
allows us to focus on political negotiation processes
and their implications, which easily pass unnoticed
in more conventional analysis. In particular, this
a p p r o a c he n a b l e su st ob e t t e ru n d e r s t a n dt h ec o m -
plex ways in which discourse is used to socially
construct the MNE and the role of the subsidiary,
how specific rhetorical arguments are used, how
discourse constructs subjectivities, and the organiza-
tional power implications of discourse use.
This study draws on a longitudinal, real-time case
study of the implementation of a new strategy
designed to take advantage of growing EU market
harmonization within the European Sales & Mar-
keting Division of a fast-moving consumer goods
(FMCG) MNE. Our analysis focused on negotiations
about the role of one of the important European
subsidiaries at a time when the European division
was undergoing transformation. Our analysis dis-
tinguishes and elaborates on three discourses that
provided distinctive ways of making sense of
and giving sense to the role of the subsidiary, and
which enabled rebalancing of the interdepen-
dence–independence tension: selling discourse,
resistance discourse and reconciliation discourse.
Based on this analysis, we develop a process
framework that elucidates the role of discourses in
making sense of the relationship between the MNE
and subsidiaries. This framework makes three con-
tributions. First, this research expands and develops
what we know about subsidiary role development
through a micro-political perspective. In particular,
our analysis elucidates the importance of both
resistance and reconciliation as mechanisms
through which subsidiary roles are enacted. In this
view, resistance is not simply subversive but is an
important part of integration and reconciliation.
Second, our analysis of the specific vocabularies,
framings and arguments that shape subsidiary role
extends our understanding of voice in subsidiaries.
In particular, we show how voice is actually exer-
cised, and explain how specific discourses enable or
constrain subsidiary voice. Third, in accordance
with the focus of the special issue, this study pro-
vides a rare example of discourse-based analysis in
an MNE context that shows the constitutive role of
language in subsidiary role evolution.
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE APPROACH TO
SUBSIDIARY EVOLUTION IN MNEs
Subsidiary Roles in MNEs
A stream of research on international business has
examined HQ–subsidiary relationships, but since the
1980s the focus has been more on subsidiary role
and subsidiary development (Birkinshaw & Hood,
1998b). This stream of literature is concerned with
the evolution of subsidiary roles over time, and
recognizes that subsidiary evolution can by driven
from within by, for example, its managers, or from
the outside by, for instance, the parent company,
and that in reality subsidiary evolution is some com-
bination of the two. External forces set the range of
opportunities open to subsidiary managers, but it is
up to those managers to choose how they respond to
these opportunities (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998a;
Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009; Birkinshaw et al.,
2005; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b).
However, the work of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993)
shows that mature MNEs may face challenges of
renewal as they have to adapt historically successful
forms of organizing to an evolving global environ-
ment, which in turn requires a change to the
HQ–subsidiary relationship, and therefore a shift
in the direction of subsidiary role evolution. Case
studies on well-known MNEs such as Philips and
Matsushita (Bartlett, 2006) demonstrate that renewal
efforts meet significant resistance as they challenge
traditional assumptions, beliefs and self-interest.
In particular, it is argued that MNEs need to move
away from traditional hierarchical hub-and-spoke
forms of organizing, often based on the exploi-
tation of local differences in autonomous country-
based operating units, to more differentiated network
forms that enable specialization where needed, but
also greater integration where possible (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1993; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997).
Selling, resistance and reconciliation Julia Balogun et al
766
Journal of International Business StudiesSuch forms of organizing suggest that MNEs have
more pluralistic and dispersed power structures
than previously acknowledged (Andersson et al.,
2007; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b; Do ¨rrenba ¨cher
& Geppert, 2006; Ferner & Edwards, 1995). Yet
much research on the MNE has been conducted
from a functionalist perspective (Do ¨rrenba ¨cher &
Geppert, 2006), in which power is either a non-
issue or is considered as largely vested with the
MNE corporate managers. Scant attention has been
paid to the power and political negotiations
between the MNE and subsidiaries as structures
change to meet the challenges of their evolving
environment (Clark & Geppert, 2011).
There are, however, important efforts to address
this neglect. The research on subsidiary roles and
charter change reveals how managers seek to
i n f l u e n c eb o t ht h ed e v e l o p m e n tp a t ho ft h e i r
subsidiary and, through these means, the MNE
overall (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998a; Birkinshaw &
Pedersen, 2009; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a,
2008b). In particular, Bouquet and Birkinshaw
(2008a) use the concept of “voice” to account for
how subsidiary managers exercise influence on the
development of the MNE. Yet in general the motiva-
tions of the subsidiary managers are largely assumed
to be in line with the interests of the MNE overall.
Subsidiary choices are generally explored in the
context of subsidiary charter expansion, and the
focus has been on innovation, growth and cap-
ability development that supports the broader
development of the MNE.
Other scholars have adopted a more explicit
power perspective to explore subsidiary develop-
ment. Within this stream of research, studies show
that subsidiaries are likely and able through their
power bases to engage in not only autonomous
behavior, but also possibly resistant or self-preser-
vation seeking behavior (Andersson et al., 2007;
Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Tempel et al., 2006). For
example, Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007) predict
the potential for autonomous (resistant) subsidiary
behavior by conceiving of HQ–subsidiary relation-
ships as a mixed-motive dyad, in which members
have interdependent as well as independent inter-
ests. Boussebaa (2009) similarly argues that there is
a dialectical relationship between subsidiaries and
headquarters, which encourages a range of micro-
political behaviors (Belanger, Edwards, & Wright,
1999; Boussebaa & Morgan, 2008) that constrain
genuine integration around unitary HQ objectives.
Some of these studies have adopted an explicit
critical angle as an alternative to the predominant
functionalist perspective. In this view, not only
have political dynamics been largely neglected
in the IB literature, but also the actions of
subsidiary managers and employees themselves.
Hence this stream of research has focused on how
managers negotiate, accept or resist HQ intended
strategies that impact on subsidiary development
(see, e.g., Clark & Geppert, 2011; Do ¨rrenba ¨cher &
Gammelgaard, 2006; Geppert & Williams, 2006;
Taplin, 2006). Whether subsidiary role changes
involve charter enlargement or reduction, micro-
political negotiation processes are an integral part of
the subsidiary development process (Do ¨rrenba ¨cher
& Gammelgaard, 2006; Taplin, 2006).
However, despite now-frequent acknowledgments
of the more pluralistic and distributed nature of
p o w e ri nM N E s ,a n do ft h ev a l u eo fe x p l o r i n gt h e
micro-political negotiations involved in shaping
MNE dynamics (see, e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw’s
review, 2008b), few studies have explored how
negotiation processes unfold between HQ managers
and subsidiary managers at times of change. A
number of factors have been found to affect these
negotiations, such as embeddedness in local markets,
external and internal legitimacy, and initiative taking
by the subsidiary, all of which can increase the
relative power of the subsidiary. As a result, sub-
sidiaries facing change that reduces their charter are
likely to resist, particularly in the case of subsidiaries
that have power arising from high performance and
local market knowledge. Yet we still know little about
how the negotiations and power plays that result are
played out. Much research to date underplays the role
of subsidiary agency in challenging the power
balance in the system (e.g., see Bouquet & Birkin-
shaw, 2008b; Do ¨rrenba ¨cher & Geppert, 2006).
Detailed consideration of the negotiations that result
from change, and other related aspects such as
conflicts in the subjective and collective identities
of key players, is still rare. As Do ¨rrenba ¨cher and
Geppert (2006: 252) conclude:
In short, what is missing in contemporary studies of the
MNE is a systematic and in-depth discussion about the role
of organizational power, politics, conflicts and resistance in
MNEs, despite what Doz and Prahalad (1993: 36–38) in their
seminal article foresaw as the importance of these issues in
outlining a new research paradigm.
We would add that the largely simplistic view of
power as control and resistance, which considers
negotiations in terms of winners and losers, over-
looks a fundamental aspect of MNEs: namely, that
within an MNE there must be a continuous tension
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767
Journal of International Business Studiesbetween global and local. This is an ongoing
tension that the MNE must continuously balance
as an organizational form, manifested in structures
where subsidiaries are both interdependent and
independent. If we do not know how the dyna-
mics of micro-political negotiations unfold at times
of charter change, we cannot understand how
tensions are either reconciled to enable a shift
in the ongoing tension in the interdependent-
independent balance, or alternately generate rifts
that threaten MNE viability as a global entity. It is
therefore important to move beyond predominant
views of control and resistance to understanding
those subtle and nuanced dynamics through which
both HQ and subsidiaries subjectively reconstruct
their independent-interdependent relationships with
each other. For this purpose,i ti sp a r t i c u l a r l yi n t e -
resting to study subsidiaries where voice and political
power are high, such as those that show the key
influences indicated by Geppert and Williams (2006):
specifically a strategic position and economic perfor-
mance that render them important, alongside an
institutional embeddedness in their local country
that accords them greater independence of prac-
tices and authority that might exacerbate tension
with the interdependent strategic approach of the
multinational group. Such subsidiaries represent
critical cases of MNE voice, political tensions bet-
ween independence and interdependence, and
their effects as they unfold during times of strategic
integration. We study such a case in our paper.
We argue that the need for systematic and in-depth
exploration of the role of organizational power,
politics, conflicts and resistance in MNEs (Do ¨rrenba ¨cher
& Geppert, 2006) points to the potential utility of a
critical discourse approach. Such an approach pro-
vides us with a methodology through which to
systematically analyze sensemaking and sensegiving
with a focus on power, not just as control and resis-
tance, but as subjective reconstructions of a subsi-
diary’s role by both the HQ and the subsidiary itself.
A Critical Discursive Perspective
There are various types of discourse analytical app-
roaches in social sciences in general, and in mana-
gement studies in particular (Alvesson & Ka ¨rreman,
2000; Boje, Oswick, & Ford, 2004; Grant, Hardy,
Oswick, & Putnam, 2004; Phillips & Hardy 2002).
Although discursive approaches have been rela-
tively rare in IB research, there have been interest-
ing openings in recent years. This is especially the
case for interpretive approaches that seek to better
understand how people socially construct reality in
international settings. In particular, various kinds
of narrative (Boje, 2007; Søderberg, 2006; Søderberg
& Holden, 2002), sensemaking (Geppert, 2003),
semiotic (Brannen, 2004) and framing (Fiss &
Hirsch, 2005) analyses have highlighted the ways
in which people make sense of internationalization
and globalization. Recently, scholars have also
started to apply explicitly critical discursive ana-
lyses to IB research, especially in the case of MNEs
(Frenkel, 2008; Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara &
Tienari, 2004, 2008). While this approach also
focuses on social constructions, it aims to link
these constructions to organizational or broader
social power relationships and structures of dom-
ination. This is why Fairclough argues that critical
discourse analysis is based on scientific realism
rather than a more relativistic understanding of
social construction (Fairclough, 2005).
More specifically, we draw from critical discourse
analysis, which is an approach originally developed
in applied linguistics to research important social
phenomena through a critical lens (Fairclough, 2003;
Wodak & Meyer, 2002). We follow the example of
others who have used and developed this perspective
to study organizational and managerial phenomena
(Hardy, Palmer, & Phillips, 2000; Maguire & Hardy,
2006, 2009; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; Phillips et al.,
2008; Vaara & Monin, 2010). Accordingly, we adopt a
broad conception of discourse as a linguistically
oriented way of making sense of a phenomenon or
an issue. This approach focuses on the central role of
language, but also emphasizes the interplay of
discourses, other social practices and material condi-
tions in organizational analysis.
As critical discursive analysis focuses on the social
construction of power relations, it is a particularly
suitable methodology for an analysis of HQ–
subsidiary relationships and voice in MNEs. More
specifically, it allows us to examine how concepts,
objects and subjectivities are constructed in and
through discourse (Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Phillips
et al., 2008). Concepts are the vocabulary through
which organizational actors make sense of phe-
nomena such as subsidiary roles. Importantly, dis-
courses also construct objects: that is, by adoption
of specific discourses, actors create their organiza-
tional reality. Such social construction involves
both reproductions of existing discourses and new
discursive innovations. For example, new initiative-
taking or profile-building may lead to the legitima-
tion and naturalization of new subsidiary roles
within an MNE. Discourses also construct subjec-
tivities for social actors at organizational and
Selling, resistance and reconciliation Julia Balogun et al
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structure of rights for the actors involved; what
they are expected to, can, or cannot do (e.g., Davies
& Harre ´, 1990). Such subjectivities are crucial for
our analysis, because they are intimately linked
with subsidiary charters and the ability to exercise
voice. That is, discourses about subsidiary roles
tend to define what the subsidiaries – and people
representing these subsidiaries – are expected to or
allowed to do: for example, their relative degree of
autonomy in decision-making or strategizing. Pre-
vailing discourses about subsidiary roles enable and
constrain the voice of subsidiaries, but exercising
voice also often involves attempts to discursively
redefine the role or charter of the subsidiary.
Importantly, one can often distinguish alterna-
tive discourses that provide very different means for
making sense of and giving sense to subsidiary
roles. In fact, these discourses can coexist in a dia-
lectical relation where more dominant discourses
are challenged by alternative ones (Mumby, 2004,
2005). Accordingly, headquarters’ views on the
limited strategic role of a specific subsidiary may
be challenged by the local people arguing for more
recognition and autonomy. Following the example
of Mumby (2004, 2005), we adopt a “discursive
struggle” perspective. According to this view, dis-
course is linked to a dialectical battle between
competing groups. This allows us to see how
discourses define subsidiary roles, but also how
the use of specific discourses is part of the battle
over power and hegemony in the MNE context.
These dialectics often involve a dynamic between
control and resistance. However, a dialectical
approach should ideally go beyond the control/
resistance dualism: “in contrast to this implicit
dualism of control and resistance, a dialectical app-
roach better captures the notion of resistance and
control as mutually constitutive, and as a routine
social production of daily organizational life”
(Mumby, 2005). This insight forms the basis for
our empirical analysis.
It is also important to emphasize intertextuality:
that is, the ways in which local discourses link
with broader societal discourses (Fairclough &
Thomas, 2004). In particular, discourses about
subsidiary roles are intrinsically linked with broader
discourses about globalization and localization,
their legitimation and resistance. For example,
arguments for increasing standardization, interde-
pendence or centralization often link with globali-
zation as a more general trend or phenomenon. In
contrast, calls for more independence or autonomy
frequently emphasize the need for local respon-
siveness and adaptation, and even the need to resist
globalization.
Thus we adopt a discursive perspective on the
dynamics of the political negotiation processes
between an MNE and its subsidiaries. This leads us
to formulate our research questions as follows:
(1) What kinds of discourses are used to make sense
of and give sense to the MNE and the role of the
subsidiary?
(2) What are the implications for subjectivity and
organizational power relations?




Our case study site is the European sales division of
Brandco, a large, multinational FMCG company.
Our analysis concentrates on negotiations about
the role of one of the important European subsi-
diaries at a time when the European division is
undergoing transformation. We focus on the
unfolding negotiations and the role of discourse
in these processes. Working within the process and
practice traditions in strategic management
research (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007;
Langley, 1999), we followed these negotiations in
real time, which arguably provides an ideal basis for
such discursive analysis. A single-site research
design is appropriate, as we are studying a rarely
explored phenomenon (Balogun & Johnson, 2004;
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) with the aim of
developing analytically generalizable findings.
Brandco historically had a country-centric way of
working. In the old model, each country-based
subsidiary had responsibility for developing its
own strategies and marketing campaigns. This built
in cost and encouraged a “not invented here”
mentality, slowing sharing of best practice and new
product roll-out. However, consumer trends and
regulation in Europe were converging, making
greater convergence in strategy and marketing
more feasible. We tracked longitudinally the evolu-
tion of a new business model put in place by the
new Head of Europe in 2004 to take advantage of
this market convergence and enable greater inte-
gration across Europe.
This new business model was facilitated by the
creation of European marketing teams (EMTs).
Selling, resistance and reconciliation Julia Balogun et al
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These teams were to take responsibility for deve-
loping new pan-European strategies and campaigns
for their brand by working in conjunction with the
individual country-based subsidiary brand teams.
They were to achieve this by working through a
“European brand network” composed of country
team representatives, who were typically the mar-
keting directors for the individual subsidiary brand
teams. The brand teams were then to be responsible
for implementing the strategies locally. This effec-
tively meant that the brand teams lost their role in
strategy formulation, and instead were asked to
focus on improving implementation, changing the
historical development path of subsidiary evolu-
tion. Each EMT was located in a different country-
based subsidiary (e.g., one in the UK, one in
Germany, one in France), with the president of
that country then acting as the sponsor of that
EMT. Each EMT was, however, deliberately staffed
with individuals drawn from different European
subsidiaries, who relocated to whichever country
their EMT was based in. The EMTs reported to the
European board which consisted of the Head of
Europe and the country presidents. The new struc-
ture therefore involved a matrix in which the
members of the European board retained country-
based responsibilities, but also held collective
responsibility across Europe through their roles as,
for example, EMT sponsors.
We focus on the EMT and associated planning
processes for Brand X. A central element of the new
business model was a new annual strategic plan-
ning mechanism, which was the key means thro-
ugh which the EMT was to deliver both integration
and localization in the strategy and marketing
of Brand X. The EMT was located in the UK and
sponsored by the UK country president, since the
market for Brand X was more developed in the UK
than elsewhere. We focus on the UK brand team’s
response to the new structure, for several reasons.
First, this is consistent with our research questions,
which aim to understand how a shift in the parent
MNE strategy affects subsidiary role evolution, and
how rebalancing occurs between the HQ and
subsidiaries. Second, as we argue above, it is impor-
tant to study subsidiaries whose voice and political
power are traditionally high. For these subsidi-
aries, new strategies that alter the independence–
interdependence HQ–subsidiary balance will most
require reconciliation on both sides to resolve
tensions. What makes this case particularly inter-
esting is that the UK was a high-performance
subsidiary. This performance record, alongside an
institutional embeddedness in their local country,
had accorded them relative independence, which
was now challenged. In addition, it was the UK’s
planning process that provided the format for
the new EU-wide planning process that was being
rolled out. Thus, from the UK’s perspective, the rest
of the EU was coming closer to them.
As shown in Table 1, following the announcement
of the new structure and associated business pro-
cesses, the new planning process consisted of a series
of activities that occurred at the level of the EMT, the
country-based brand teams, the European board,
and the country-based senior management teams,
providing a series of natural multilevel data collec-
tion points. We therefore tracked the evolution of
the subsidiary role using a longitudinal, qualitative,
case-based approach (Pettigrew, 1992), common in
studies of strategic change but less so in interna-
tional business (Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen,
2009; Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannak, & Paavilainen-
Ma ¨ntyma ¨ki, 2010). Access was facilitated by the
first author’s previous research engagement with the
organization dating back to 2000, and her existing
acquaintance with some of the UK senior managers.
This enabled us to engage in an intensive analysis
because of existing levels of trust and knowledge
of the organization’s context, markets and products.
A strength of this longitudinal approach is that it
provided real-time data on the unfolding change
process, including both its legitimation by those
responsible for the implementation of the new
business model and resistance from the recipients.
Access for this research commenced in autumn
2003 when the first author was alerted to the forth-
coming changes. Initial interviews were conduc-
ted as background with the UK strategy planning
manager, to understand the prior UK practices, and
with the change director to understand how the
change was to be rolled out. We then tracked the
development of the new planning process during
its first year of operation from the perspective of
both senior and middle EMT managers, the brand
network members of the main, geographic subsi-
diaries (UK, Germany, France, Spain, Nordic, Cen-
tral Europe), who were also the marketing directors
of the country-based Brand X teams, and the UK
Brand X team. Additionally, we interviewed the UK
senior managers involved in the change, specifi-
cally the UK president and the UK sales director
responsible for the UK brand team. In addition to
the marketing director of the UK Brand X team, we
interviewed his senior marketing manager and
Selling, resistance and reconciliation Julia Balogun et al
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were designed to be small core teams, our main
EMT interviewee was the EMT director, although
we also interviewed two of the four EMT marketing
managers. Access was facilitated by the fact that the
team was based in the UK.
Data
We gathered extensive textual data, and conducted
a multifaceted analysis of the discursive aspects of
the negotiation processes. The empirical material
comprised various kinds of documents, presenta-
tions, interviews of the key managers, and informal
and formal discussions with these managers. Rather
than one corpus, our analysis was based on several
types of textual material. This kind of approach has
been advocated recently as an alternative to the
conventional focus on specific texts alone, and is
particularly suitable for an analysis that examines
resistance to specific texts. For example, Phillips
et al. (2008: 784) point out that a sole reliance on
official texts is a problem for research projects
taking a discourse approach, as “they only pick up
the effects of acceptance and can tell us little about
resistance to the truth effects of discourse.” They
also argue that it is only by refusing to restrict
research solely to the realm of printed texts that it
is possible to follow discursive struggles as they
unfold. Gathering discursive data from multiple
sources was crucial for our purposes; in particular, it
helped us to understand the significance of specific
discursive acts and to place them in context (see,
e.g., Jarzabkowski & Sillince, 2007; Phillips et al.,
2008; Vaara & Monin, 2010).
Data collection was carried out by the first two
authors. First, we collected all available company
documents and material that helped us to better
understand the background to the negotiations. This
included copies of pertinent presentations given to
explain the change process, presentations given by
the EMT and the brand team, and templates that
were both inputs to and outputs of the planning
process, providing over 350 pages of documents for
analysis. We focused on the presentations made by
key managers, although there were few formal pre-
sentations beyond the initial presentation to launch
the changes. Local brand teams learnt of the impact
of the new strategy, structure and planning processes
largely through their work with the EMTs.
Second, we interviewed our key individuals from
March 2004 to January 2005, with dates coinciding
with key events in the planning process, as shown
in Table 1. We used a narrative interview style
(Czarniawska, 2004), encouraging participants to
explain their experience of events in each stage of
the process, and how it affected their local strategiz-
ing, as well as their responses to collective European
strategizing activities. We used an overview of the
Table 1 Timeline for strategic planning process
Month Strategic planning events Campaign development
European marketing teams Brand teams European marketing teams Brand teams
January–March European strategy
development
March Sign off (with European
board) and issue
European strategy
April–May Key issue development European campaign
development
June Key issue review meeting Key issue review meeting







September Sign off of market plans
by country presidents
(Continued)
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on where they were in the process. The first two
authors consistently interviewed the same indivi-
duals to ensure follow-through from one interview to
the next, and also exchanged notes between inter-
view rounds to capture reflections coming from some
interviewees and not others, so that these could be
followed up with all individuals. We sought to collect
the personal views of each individual. Thus we
always opened the interviews with questions about
where they were in the process, and what they were
currently working on. We then encouraged openness
with simple questions such as what is going well and
w h y ,a n dw h a ti sg o i n gl e s sw e l la n dw h y .A sp o i n t s
were raised, we probed for more detail. Thus we
moved from more factual accounts to more personal
ones. Knowledge of the setting was key. It was
important to use and understand context-sensitive
language when discussing both the planning process
and the structure with the interviewees, to create a
conversation style and enable the interviewees to
narrate their experiences without constantly inter-
rupting them with questions about terms and
mnemonics. Each interview lasted about an hour,
and all were audio-recorded and transcribed.
Third, we prepared a report on our findings
for the director of the Brand X EMT, and the UK
country president (also sponsor of the Brand X
EMT). We held a one and a half hour meeting with
these three individuals in 2005 to discuss our
findings. Detailed notes including verbatim quotes
were taken and typed up within 24h.
We took several steps to ensure the trustworthiness
of our qualitative data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The
first author had prolonged engagement with the
research site, not only during this research project,
but also through previous research projects. The
multiple sources of evidence allowed us to pursue
a “triangulation” strategy: to continuously compare
the evidence coming from different sources. This
triangulation was not merely about authenticating
accounts (e.g., Jick, 1979; Yin, 1994), typical in tradi-
tional international business research, but more
about explicitly seeking to understand the different
perspectives, experiences and meanings of different
respondents, allowing “multiple voices” to be heard
in the process (Piekkari et al., 2009). The contacts
with key managers and the final report provided
important feedback and means to validate our inter-
pretations. In addition, our study is written up
through a thick description of the findings to enable
their transfer to other settings, and to mitigate issues
of generalizability. However, we also acknowledge
the limitations of single-site case studies, recogniz-
ing that interpretations of any findings can be
subjective, and that the generalization of findings
may need to be established through further research.
Analysis
As is usually the case with discourse analysis, our
approach was “abductive” in nature (Wodak, 2004).
That is, we proceeded in stages, where specific
theoretical ideas were developed alongside increas-
ingly accurate mapping of this case. In simple
terms, our analysis involved three stages: construc-
tion of a chronological narrative of the episodic
events; general analysis of the development and use
of alternative discourses in this context; and a more
specific critical discursive analysis of selected texts.
First, we constructed a chronological narrative of
the episodic events (Langley, 1999; Pentland,
1999). This allowed us to develop an increasingly
detailed understanding of how key managers made
sense of and gave sense to the planned changes. At
first, the first author (who focused on the members
of the EMT, the UK senior managers and the brand
network members) and the second author (who
focused on the UK brand team) constructed narra-
tives incorporating both relevant documentary
data and data from the interviews, to develop rich
narratives of how various groups of people gave
sense to and made sense of change over time. These
narratives were then compared and complemented.
Based on these rich descriptions, two competing
high-level themes (Miles & Huberman, 1994) were
identified, to do with “this is integration” for the
EMT vs “this is centralization” for the brand team.
In the second phase, we examined these nego-
tiations from a discursive perspective by focusing
on the ways in which the changes and their
implications were represented in the organization
over time. We iterated between the narratives and
the interviews and documents to develop a deeper
understanding of, and evidence base for, central
themes such as the remit of the EMTs and the brand
teams, roles in the new structure, working relation-
ships, interpretations of the new structure, and
response to the new structure. This analysis led to
us to identify and elaborate on key differences in
the ways in which the managers holding different
positions presented the changes, and how all this
changed over time. Through these means we iden-
tified three discourses about subsidiary roles, which
we labeled “selling,” “resistance” and “reconcili-
ation” discourses. It became evident that although
the EMT were positioning the new structure and
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team were resisting this through a discourse of
“centralization,” over time a reconciliation deve-
loped that enabled a more collaborative way of
working between the EMT and the brand team.
Once we had identified these three discourses we
went back to the documentary and interview data
to examine these discourses in more detail. As we
further analyzed the data extracts it became clear
that we could identify distinctive ways in which
these discourses
(1) constructed a particular kind of image of the
MNE organization and subsidiary role,
(2) used particular rhetorical strategies to promote
or resist changes, and
(3) created different subject positions for the EMT
and the brand team.
This led us to recode the empirical material and
focus on specific discursive features. Table 2 provi-
des typical examples of our coding.
Finally, following the guidelines of critical dis-
course analysis (Vaara & Tienari, 2004), we then
focused on a more in-depth discursive analysis of
specific instances of presentations or interview
transcripts to capture typical and/or particularly
influential speech acts in these negotiation pro-
cesses. This included an increasingly detailed ana-
lysis of the use of various concepts, rhetorical
arguments, metaphors and modalities. Because of
space limitations, we can only offer some examples
of these micro-level findings in this paper. How-
ever, this micro-level analysis was essential. It
enabled us to exemplify and substantiate the ways
in which these three discourses developed and
changed over time.
FINDINGS
In this section we present in story form the three
discourses identified in our analysis: the selling dis-
course, the resistance discourse and the reconciliation
discourse. Table 3 summarizes the key characteristics
of these discourses, the way they were drawn upon
and their implications for rebalancing the subsidiary–
HQ relationship during strategic integration.
The Selling Discourse: This is Integration
Starting from the initial presentation in 2004, the
European board and the EMT made significant
efforts to explain and gain support for the European
approach. This discourse drew on a generic discourse
about the need for integration in companies in the
way they do business in Europe as European and
global markets change, and portrayed the group as a
moving toward a truly integrated MNE. The selling
efforts involved rhetorical strategies such as focus on
the benefits of integration and keeping silent about
“centralization,” and constructed the EMT as the
strategists while the role of the UK subsidiary
managers was to implement the strategies.
Construction of MNE: A truly European group
The selling discourse was closely linked to more
general business discourse about appropriate
responses to globalization. For example, the initial
presentation in 2004 focused on a new business
model in terms of the opportunities presented by
the changing EU markets. In communications,
Brandco was generally represented as a “true”
MNE within which the sales division had to pursue
appropriate strategies of integration. For example,
one of the first presentations of the business model
(January 2004) argued for a “need to adopt a more
integrated European business model” to preserve
growth. This new model would then “drive a
European approach to key brands, core capabilities
and a range of functional activities.” The objectives
included “raising average performance by leveraging
country-based expertise, faster adoption of quality
brand strategy and campaigns, driving implemen-
tation of best practice, reduce duplication.” Accord-
ingly, EMTs were to “develop superior European
strategy” and to “work with markets to ensure that
the output is truly European” and “also be responsi-
ble for campaign development although these can
be customized locally.”
In particular, the selling discourse focused on
“European” identity: for example, slides presen-
ted by the EMT at meetings in June 2004 that
argued that the intent was for everyone to “think
European – culturally and commercially.” In fact,
“European” was presented as a new identity that
could bring the country organizations together. For
example, notions such as “truly European” refer
to a need to identify with European values, and act
accordingly throughout the sales division. The cru-
cial point is that this view of the organization
implied a fundamental change to how the organi-
zation had been viewed in the past.
Rhetorical strategies: Arguing for a pan-European
approach
The EMT discourse provided convincing rhetorical
arguments for the new strategy. In the European
managers’ argumentation, the purpose of the EMT
business model was to support the growth of the
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Documents Interviews
Social construction of MNE
organization
Selling discourse:
X operates in a rapidly evolving, increasingly hostile and
complex marketplace. Our existing business model is now
constraining our ability to compete in this environment. In
order to realize our business objectives and achieve our full
potential X Europe needs to adopt a more integrated
European business model. (Initial presentation)
Selling discourse:
So we are trying to make sure there is, for example, a single campaign across Europe, a single
strategy across Europe, a single philosophy to this particular business area. And behave much
more like a European brand team, rather than a central function. (EMT member)
Resistance discourse:
My understanding of why it was introduced was about creating a sort of, sort of centre which
was about identifying best practice and about saying well this is what we should be doing, this
is best practice, actually bringing all markets up to an even level to make sure that good work
was recognized in markets and translated across to other markets. (Brand team member)
Reconciliation discourse:
The markets still have a role to play in terms of knowing their customers better than anybody
else, and actually delivering the overall direction of Europe in Germany, Greece, wherever.
(EMT Member)
Rhetorical strategies Selling discourse:
What is in it for us?
K EMT and local brand teams working together to drive
K Effective and efficient campaign development
J removes duplication of effort
J saves a lot of energy and time
J avoids inconsistency of message
K Working together we can
J focus on operational excellence
J drive local initiatives to deliver revenues
J more likely to create critical mass needed to
achieve sales
(Presentations by EMT members)
Selling discourse:
Raising the average standard of strategy outputs, implementation, everything, within the
market. (EMT member)
Resistance discourse:
I would be very surprised, you know, it is the top-performing country in terms of sales, so I
would be surprised that most of the stuff that we talk about is evidence based, I mean that we
have got the data to prove that the message that they have proposed across Europe isn’t really
effective in the UK. (Brand team member)
Reconciliation discourse:
We are doing much more around it’s the brand network that decides what’s red, amber and
green. So what are the things that we must go with y We didn’t do that in June. We didn’t
agree it, it was the EMT. Which is so much (better) y . because you own it y So we are all
agreeing. (Brand team member)
Implications for subjectivity Selling discourse:
Slide on implications for local markets with headings
“Campaign translation” and “Campaign
implementation”:
K You now have responsibility to take the baton
K And implement in your country
(Presentation by EMT director)
Selling discourse:
We’re talking about a group of people who are now part of a network, whose whole lives are now
getting tied up with the EMT and part of what we said to them, when we had our first network
meeting, was to say y this is how the system is going to work y you are going to be ambassadors
within your own country for what the EMT is trying to achieve y it is your job to go away from this
meeting and argue why this is the right thing for Germany, or Spain, or Italy, to do. (EMT member)
Resistance discourse:
It almost like if this was a car, they have been asked to scope out the strategic need for the vehicle,
to design the vehicle and virtually to build the vehicle and deliver it to out door and hand us the
keys. And we drive it. (Brand team member)
Reconciliation discourse:
B u t ,a tt h es a m et i m ew eh a v eg o tt og e te x c e l l e n tat implementing. So for us the rolling out and
making sure that the sales group really understand these key issues. And we are doing our best to
help them translate that to how they actually work with the customer. So we have got to get
closer, if anything, to what our customers are about. Because that is the bit then that we can
influence back into Europe. And that’s been a big thing of what I am trying to change the mindset



























































































sbiggest brands in Europe, and give Europe a single
voice within the global organization. These argu-
ments were a key part of the plans and presentation
material, as well as the discussions in the work-
shops. Rhetorical arguments focused on the benefits
created by the coordination and integration of the
activities conducted in various European markets.
Justifications drew from appealing business jargon,
including notions such as “core capabilities” and
superlatives such as “superior European strategy.”
From early in March 2004, when the new struc-
ture had only just been set up, the EMT members
were clear that their remit was to “set the European
strategy y and includes the campaign,” and that
the new structure was about creating an integrative
way of working to achieve this. For example, the
presentation slides in June 2004 argued that the new
strategy would lead to “a European brand team”
working with local brand teams, who existed “to
realize the commercial potential of the portfolio
by delivering pan-European marketing (strategy,
branding, campaign development and implemen-
tation), and enabling local markets to focus on
operational effectiveness.”
In the selling discourse, arguments were freque-
ntly presented as fact-like statements. The discourse
thus did not leave room for speculation, at least in
the case of the benefits to be achieved by a joint
strategy. At times, the discourse was normative, so
that the new strategy was portrayed as a “must” and
an “obligation.” This was the case especially with
the interviews. For example, a member of the EMT
argued that “I mean it is harder and harder to
generate growth out of the big markets y growth
must come through doing things better and driving
growth in sales of existing products.”
Once the initial strategy had been introduced, and
the brand teams had started to translate it into key
issues for their local markets, the EMT turned their
attention to the creation of a pan-European market-
ing campaign, recognizing again that this changed
the local roles: “Their remit is very different now y
Therefore the way that they are going to go through
the planning is more about how do I take what the
EMT is putting out, and implement it brilliantly.”
The EMT remained clear that the new structure was
about integration: “We see our role as being a
European brand team, so trying to look at Europe
as a single market, understanding what’s common
a n dw h a t ’ sd i f f e r e n t ,b u tf o c u so nw h a ti sc o m m o n ,
and tailor it to the differences.”
Through such statements the EMT members
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concerns. In addition, they saw additional benefits,
such as cost savings: “So there’s one side which is
there is a need for more European coordination,
and internally and externally there is an opportu-
nity to raise the overall standard. And there is also
then that if you did that, and you did that well, it
should also take costs out as well, so it is a win, win,
win from that point of view.” Furthermore, the
benefits of best practices were emphasized in this
discussion: “I have got a broader view of what is
going on in other markets, what might work, what
might not have worked, where the aim is the same
but the tactics are different.”
Importantly, the EMT representatives were con-
scious of language as a way to create specific
meanings about their control over the new
strategic planning process. This was the case, for
example, with the term “challenge” as explained by
the EMT:
I think we are going to have to use words like challenge,
because otherwise the importance of the meeting, kind of,
you know, people do not actually step up to it unless you
give a little bit of a sharp jerk in terms of the remit of us
working on behalf of the European Board.
From early on, the EMT members were conscious of
the sensitivity around the term “centralization.”
This led to a deliberate strategy to talk about
“integration, not centralization” when arguing for
and legitimating the new control system. This
statement thus became a central part of the selling
discourse, for the EMT:
Consultative, collaborative, integrated is actually the word,
not centralized. An EMT is all about integration not
centralization. So it’s about integrating Europe together
and that we are actually a more powerful force y
This comment, like many others, focused on
playing down the top-down control, with carefully
chosen words and euphemisms. “Centralization”
was seen as a “taboo,” and thus terms such as “con-
sultative,” “collaborative” and “integration” were
frequently used in the EMT’s discourse. These can
be seen as illustrations of “double-talk,” where a
specific meaning is avoided by strongly emphasiz-
ing the opposite.
Implications for subjectivity: EMT as strategists, local
teams as implementers
The EMT’s discourse reproduced their subjectivity
as the key strategists in charge. The role given to the
local managers was to participate, in a limited
sense, in planning and, primarily, to implement the
plans. The official discourse, as manifested in
documents and presentations, was never explicit
about this underlying idea of division of labor.
However, the interviews included a great deal of
transparent comment about this. For example, an
EMT member put it as follows:
We are taking away the strategy part, the branding part,
but we are giving them the opportunity to focus (a) on
operational and implementation excellence, and (b) on
things that are more specific to market y things that they
have not been doing so far because they were focusing more
on the other things y which seem to be more sexy and
attractive, or they were the traditional job of the brand
team, the brand manager.
This comment reveals how the EMT wanted to
define the role of local brand managers in the
subsidiaries. It was to be operational (“operational
and implementation excellence”) and traditional
(“traditional job”) while the EMT would be respon-
sible for the larger and more complex issues.
Central to this discourse was the construction of
the EMT as the key strategists in charge of strategy:
We are there to set the European strategy, which includes
brand positioning and includes the key messages and
includes the campaign y what we are not saying is we have
all of the strategies, we have the main core strategies y We
are not thinking about those, kind of, smaller tactical
strategies, if you like, but the bigger helicopter core main
strategies that drive everything.
Note how the EMT team members also used speci-
fic vocabulary to make further distinctions. For
example, “strategic” is linked with “important”
(e.g., “core”, “main” and “bigger”), and is the EMT’s
responsibility. In contrast, “tactical” means “less
important” (e.g., “smaller”), and is to be done by
the local managers in subsidiaries. This comment,
as well as many others, also included interesting
metaphors used to make sense of the new division
of labor (e.g., “helicopter” (view)).
Importantly, the selling discourse also included
attempts to counter or at least alleviate the under-
lying fears of those losing independence or auton-
omy in the subsidiaries. For example, the members
of the EMT picked up on the language used in the
initial presentation. The EMT was to work through
a “network.” The members of this brand network
had been told that they were to be “ambassadors
within your own country for what the EMT is trying
to achieve.” This position was maintained with
references to “we are not a central function sitting
in an ivory tower,” and later references to the EMT
as steering a “flotilla” of boats rather than putting
people on a “ferry.” The language used was
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example, the use of “we” to refer both to them-
selves and the local teams.
Power implications
This discourse had significant implications for the
organizational power relations, as it essentially
legitimated a new control system, and reduced
the role of the local managers in subsidiaries. This
was most evident in the way that the European
board was invoked: for example, in presentations
the board had “endorsed the Brand X strategy.” The
EMT were clear that to enforce their position they
could draw on the Head of Europe, who would
know what the EMT was expecting from each
market, and could “challenge” if it wasn’t deliv-
ered. It is thus no wonder that (in particular)
especially the managers of the UK subsidiary
resisted these changes and argued against the new
model in various forums – as explained in the
following section.
The Resistance Discourse: This Doesn’t Feel Like
Integration
The selling discourse triggered responses among UK
managers, leading to increasingly clearly articula-
ted resistance, both at the local subsidiary and in
negotiations with the EMT. In their discourse, they
repeatedly emphasized the special nature of the UK,
argued for uniqueness and the consequent need for
local adaptation, and strongly resisted the implied
loss of autonomy in the new business model.
Construction of MNE: About under performers, not
the UK
Initially, the UK managers did not know how to
make sense of the new model and its implications.
For example, when the UK brand team members
were interviewed in July, their understanding of the
purpose of the new structure and planning process,
and the role of the EMT was still sketchy: “to reduce
costs, improve quality across Europe y The point is
I do not know what the objective was. The fact that
I am guessing it now is, it has not been commu-
nicated, it’s not clear.” The new structure was
largely seen as a cost-saving mechanism: “I know
already we are not going to be doing any more
market research, we are just going to cut a lot of
that y so it is a cost-saving exercise, it is going to
save us. I guess that’s ultimately the main aim of it.”
They drew on a discourse that was about the need
for ongoing local adaptation to question the new
structure and planning process.
It was understood that the EMT was there to
“develop a unified, consistent strategy for that
product area y so that all the markets are actually
on the same positioning of the brand” On the other
hand, this had few implications for the UK, as the
European strategy devised by the EMT was largely
the strategy that the UK was already following:
“And really the strategy fundamentally it is the UK
strategy. It wasn’t a huge change from our point of
view. No huge surprises at all.” Thus the strategy was
for other less developed markets, not the UK: “And
that it would bring all the countries up that aren’t
doing so well up to a certain level. Anyone who is
over performing or doing particularly well won’t be
brought down, they will be left and given a free rein
to achieve what they are going to achieve.”
Rhetorical strategies: Focus on uniqueness
As the campaign was issued in July, it became clear
that the purpose was to develop consistency across
all countries, not simply to improve the perfor-
mance of smaller markets. This generated strong
reactions: “How do we make a campaign live with
the sales force that we haven’t been involved with at
all?” A particular issue for the UK was that the team
felt that the EU campaign was a backward step for
them. They had a more developed market than
other countries, and were facing a particular compe-
titive threat from a particular competitor. Although
they didn’t like the visual imagery of the campaign,
they could accept that the imagery was the one that
had tested best with consumers, and were willing to
use it: “At the end of the day it was the one that
tests the best. So if we were doing it solely for the UK
then probably that would be slightly different y but
at the end of the day it has tested really well, so we
sort of went with it.” However, they felt strongly
that they needed a stronger marketing message.
Consequently, key UK managers started to explicitly
emphasize that the UK was a special case in their
communications. This discourse drew from and
reproduced the more general discourse about the
need for local adaptation.
The representatives of the UK organization argued
forcefully that the UK differed in a number of ways.
It was “a top performing country,” for example, and
therefore should not need to conform to a universa-
listic European campaign. This was also apparent in
the frequent use of notions such as “different” and
“unique.” The following is a typical example:
The UK is a very different market. And I guess where I
see their message which is probably more of a market
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across Europe we are probably the only market that has
heavily invested in market shaping and market develop-
ment activities to date. And as a result of that I think we are
in a very different place.
This resistance talk underscored the “developed”
and “successful” nature of the UK operation. Thus
this discourse provided a business rationale for
questioning the pan-European strategy, as in the
following comment:
We do have 50% of the European business. So, you know,
we are not doing it all wrong y we welcome expertise and
ideas, and some direction, but actually the idea is to say,
work with us to develop the best approach for our market.
Rather than directives to say you will do this.
This argumentation often made a categorical dis-
tinction between “we” (the UK team) and “they”
(the EMT) to underscore the special nature of the
British case. This was very different from the ambi-
guous discourse of EMT members, who often used
“we” to refer to both top management and country
representatives. The benefits of “engagement” and
“commitment” were also brought up in the local
managers’ comments:
The last campaign that we did, which was launched in sales
in May. You know, we worked with a creative agency, we
had our objectives, we had our key messages that we had
developed. Loads of input from our sales force y The end
result being y You end up with a campaign that the people
in the field are championing, and sort of believe it is the
right way to go y They own it.
Overall, this discourse emphasized the ability of the
local managers to successfully plan and execute
campaigns, as shown in the examples above. This
was an important aspect of the arguments that
provided the local actors with a subject position of
capable agents. This is a theme that we will focus on
in the next section.
Implications for subjectivity: Resistance to loss of
autonomy
The UK brand team saw the new structure as
leading to a loss of autonomy. Local managers
experienced the new campaign as being “given
a car to drive.” Most managers perceived that only
their brand network member was involved and
consulted, and not the rest of the team. The
essential point for brand teams was that the new
strategy discourse implied a shift from autonomous
strategic agents to implementers of strategies that
were defined elsewhere. This was seen as proble-
matic in terms of being able to execute local
campaigns effectively, as explained by a brand
manager:
It has just been completely different (discussing the
campaign) y What we are now doing is we have been
given something by the EMT and saying, almost just
checking is this right for the UK y there will be reduction
from a creative point of view.
At the same time, the loss of autonomy was
seen as reducing their professional status, and even
personally denigrating, as reflected in this parallel
with cooking:
So it’s like, I guess in a way, it’s kind of like, it’s like turn-
ing up at home and all the vegetables and all the meat has
been prepared and all you have to do is put it in the oven
rather than actually have to go to the shop and buy
everything, find out what everyone wants, do all the
preparation and then put it in the oven y you are just
doing the last stage of it.
The suspicion was that the true purpose was cost
saving: “And that makes me think it is more of
a cost saving thing than simply improving market-
ing practice across Europe.” The resistance dis-
course also questioned the underlying motives of
the EMT people. For example, “centralization” was
seen as serving the interests of top management.
The following is a typical example:
And there is an underlying drive which I think is coming
from the top y to say we want complete consistency y it is
almost like going from a thousand flowers blooming to sort
of like central control, central planning, central wisdom, in
a single cycle.
In contrast, the local managers emphasized their
own capabilities, and played down the benefits of
the new pan-European strategy, using the following
types of explanations:
I think a lot of what we are doing in the UK is quite a lot
ahead, for example we have a market development team
that isn’t consistent throughout Europe y Because we are
already doing it, because we are quite a long way ahead,
actually some of the work from the EMT is almost behind
where we already are. So I think that there is a bit of, sort
of, actually what is it that is going to really benefit our
market and to be totally honest I have not seen anything
new that has come out and we have said, wow, that’s great,
and we must do that in our market. Most of it is actually
below where we are at the moment.
Note how the text repeatedly underscores the
superior abilities of the local team by terms such
as “quite a lot ahead,” “quite a long way ahead,”
“almost behind where we already are” and “below
where we are at the moment.” The point was to
emphasize the fact that the UK team was already
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execution of campaigns, so it would not be a good
idea to reduce their autonomy.
Power implications
This resistance discourse had implications, as it
challenged the legitimacy of the new business model
in the UK subsidiary, but also to some extent more
broadly in Europe. Comments in the interviews
revealed that the UK felt they did not benefit from
the input from the EMT, given their own capabil-
ities, which they could have used to “produce
something higher quality.” Thus it became increas-
ingly clear for the EMTand UK brand team that they
were experiencing a conflict that could damage the
successful operation of the group.
Reconciliation Discourse: Important Centre,
Important Subsidiary
The people involved in the marketing campaign
started to search actively for a reconciliation. This
led to a new discourse that emphasized the need for
integration, but also respected local expertise, used
exemplification and inclusiveness as rhetorical
strategies, and allowed for both the EMT and the
UK managers to save face.
Construction of MNE: Respects local expertise
Initially, the EMT saw the ongoing differences of
opinion about the campaign as a challenge to their
authority, which threatened to bring down the new
integrated strategy model:
And it is not actually what is the best thing y it’s the matter
of how within the model do you account for that. Do you
y whose responsibility ultimately is it to make that
decision? And y I guess the way it probably should work
is the EMT should ultimately listen as much as possible, and
seek to understand as much as possible, and ultimately
make the decision and be responsible for it.
As the EMT continued to push a consistent
campaign, the UK brand team felt disenfranchised.
They perceived that the dispute was not just about
strategic integration, but also about the EMT not
wanting to give in their model of the MNE,
“because effectively we are saying the same thing,
we are just strengthening it, but y if this happens
in the UK it looks like the UK are going against
European strategy so they feel like they (EMT) have
been less successful and not got the complete
consistency across Europe.”
For resolution, key people such as the UK sales VP
and the EMT sponsor promoted a compromise that
would build on the new model but emphasize local
expertise and the need for adjustments when
needed:
The model is set up to raise the overall standard of Europe,
it’s not to be y it’s not set up to be y to develop a better
UK strategy and then implement that elsewhere. It’s to
develop the best strategy for Europe as a whole, but to make
sure that gets implemented as well as possible everywhere.
So the UK may well come and say we are different because
dot, dot, dot y and actually it is because they are doing a
lot better.
This included recognition in the brand team of the
need for a respect for local knowledge when
developing global solutions:
I don’t think it’s as tricky, because I think actually [our
Directors} we heard them the other day saying at the
Marketing excellence conference y They understand that
there has got to be a change of mindset and behavior with
themselves, so like with the advert, etc., XXX would have
been involved if it was a UK advertising y And he’s learning
that, and I am learning how to keep him involved, but also
for information, but also like, what I can take back to
influence.
This discourse was launched as a reconciliation that
would both make business sense and ensure the
commitment of all key actors.
Rhetorical strategies: Important centre, important
subsidiary
This discourse was built on specific decisions that
were used as symbols exemplifying the new way of
thinking. It started with a decision that the UK could
do something different with one of the messages: “the
EMT Director was really good, it is a business decision,
we’ve agreed to do it because the UK is slightly
ahead of other markets” (brand team member).
In addition, there were other modifications to the
planning process. Particular activities were color-
coded according to the extent to which local brand
teams could negotiate them with the EMT. These
activities and their color coding were now agreed
with the brand network members in terms of their
local autonomy over input into the plans, rather
than being imposed by the EMT. The UK managers’
practical experience in meetings now showed them
that their views mattered within a more global
approach to strategy and marketing development:
“there was much more dialogue y going on one y
y and it was just so different y and that’s because
It h i n ky it wasn’t just a presentation from the EMT
y there was involvement in stuff beforehand.”
Another key rhetorical strategy was a focus on
inclusiveness. That is, the new discourse focused on
“involvement” in a less ambiguous way than the
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frequent use of “we” and avoidance of “us” vs
“them” constructions that characterized the resis-
tance discourse (see also the next subsection).
Implications for subjectivity: Saving face
The EMT were pleased to have their position as
strategy formulators reinforced hierarchically:
People should accept the fact that the reason why the Head
of Europe set up the EMTs was to raise the average across
Europe and have a consistent campaign and strategy for
80% of Europe or 90% of Europe. So even if we consciously
accept that this might not be perfect for every market, still
we should be doing that, because we want all 40þ markets
to perform well.
At the same time, they had made a shift to allow for
market differences in important markets: “so it is
not a question of y coming up with an advert,
which is just chucking it out, but you are trying to
develop something with the markets together, to
get buy-in.”
The EMT modified the planning process in terms
of opportunities for participation for the UK and
other larger and more important markets, such as
France and Germany:
The way things have been developed by us now, is by
involving the market very, very early on in the process and
actually, most of the things we are doing now we are
starting with a clean sheet of paper and we are starting
together with the markets y So, we have got the forum
there to discuss it now, we cannot make a democracy,
someone in the end needs to make a decision about things,
and clearly the decision will not please everyone. But I think
the process is there in place and the forum is there for
people to challenge each other and make their arguments
heard in that forum.
Note the shift in language, with repeated references
to “we” and the sense of doing things together,
allowing for the importance of local market knowl-
edge. However, the EMT were careful to preserve
their position as the key strategy formu-
lators, with the right to ultimately decide (“we
cannot make a democracy; someone in the end
needs to make a decision about things”). The EMT
modified their position: to be the key decision-
makers, but allow others to emerge as experts.
This bigger involvement of members of the brand
network moved the relationship from one to do
with strategists vs implementers, dominant vs sub-
ordinate, to one of more joint decision-making. It
no longer “felt like a do unto” by the EMT to the
UK. The UK were able to acknowledge the need to
get a solution that worked for Europe, as long as
their local market had been considered, and the
implications of the decision for their market was
taken into account, “to challenge for the UK
perspective y But at the same time making sure
that you are getting something that has worked,
not only for the UK but it works more for Europe, so
that is a really, you know, OK, we are going to let
that go because it pulls back Europe.” There was
even a sense that because it was possible to influ-
ence in Europe, this afforded the UK team a “much
more exciting role”:
I really enjoy being able to influence and have a bigger role
within Europe. And one of the things we are trying to
explain to the brand team at the moment is that you can
influence, not only just, you know, have an influence on
this market here but you are actually influencing the whole
of Europe.
In addition, the UK was willing to recognize that
when there was dissent, the EMT needed to make
the final decision:
You know, working across all the markets, everyone
reinvents different campaigns etc, which is ridiculous, so
I am there with that as long as we have the integration y
There does have to be a call, probably [the EMT director]
saying, right, we have heard that, we have got everybody’s
discussion, lets close it down now.
As the planning process developed, the UK also
perceived the opportunities afforded for sharing
best practice as helpful, such as at the September
and June meetings:
No, no, it was really valuable y the first time I sat there
with other countries you have got similar issues to us, and
maybe just got different ways to tackle them, so I certainly,
we took a lot away from listening y I guess if you think
about it its odd in a way that we have always worked and
such silos y
Power implications
All this led to a new understanding of the new
business model in which powerful subsidiaries felt
that the EMT respected their expertise:
They are not experts greater than anybody else, they are,
their brains are no better than anybody else, what they
develop is no better. Actually consultatively if it becomes
a lot more consultation and involvement and they’re
coordinating it and making sure that best practice is shared,
I think there is a great opportunity there.
Consequently, there was a greater acceptance
of the EMT’s role: “It is like they are expecting the
milkman to bring the milk in the morning, they are
only interested in the date they are going to receive
it, they are not afraid that this is going to take
Selling, resistance and reconciliation Julia Balogun et al
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there was also a recognition by those in the brand
teams that their job roles had changed irrevocably:
That’s probably a given now, isn’t it. So there’s no point me
getting sensitive about it. My job’s changed, their job’s new,
people have moved from all sorts of functions to the EMT; I
am sure there would be an opportunity to move to the EMT
so, I suppose I am just thinking that that’s a fact of life, get
on with it.
This individual took a position in an EMT based in
France. Similarly, senior UK country managers were
evolving their behaviors, as highlighted above:
“And he’s learning that, and I am learning how to
keep him involved.” Finally, the EMT were adjust-
ing behaviors through actions, such as involving
the brand network members more in projects, and
taking on board local learning, such as running
competitor games around the new competitor
dynamics that the UK were facing.
Discussion
Although research on MNEs has been largely
functionalist in orientation, recent studies have
highlighted the importance of power and politics
in subsidiary role evolution (Andersson et al., 2007;
Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a, 2008b; Clark &
Geppert, 2011; Do ¨rrenba ¨cher & Geppert, 2006;
Geppert & Williams, 2006; Tempel et al., 2006).
The starting point of this paper has been to add
to this research by using a critical discursive
perspective to explore the MNE–subsidiary political
negotiation processes at times of change. The
discourse perspective enables us to focus on the
constitutive role of language in these negotiations.
Our analysis shows how the negotiations revolve
around specific vocabularies, framings and argu-
ments, such as “integration” and “centralization,”
and rhetorical strategies, such as the benefits of
integration vs localization, which are used to legi-
timate or resist the new subsidiary role. It would,
however, be a mistake to see discourse as “mere”
words. The discourses were constitutive in the sense
of constructing specific conceptions of the MNE
and particular subjectivities for the actors involved.
Furthermore, these discourses were closely linked
and coupled with organizational action, and were
not only “official” or “ceremonial” speeches or dis-
parate comments made in particular circumstances.
Exploring these issues in Brandco’s European
sales and marketing division led us to identify the
three discourses of selling, resistance and reconci-
liation presented in the findings. This analysis not
only uncovers the most obvious and expected
conflicts between HQs and subsidiaries at times
of role change; it also allows us to deepen our
understanding of the implications of the process
through which discursive struggles unfold. A key
explanation of why the reconciliation discourse
enabled the reconstruction of subjective identities
of both subsidiary and HQ actors can be found in
the way it recognized the central role of both for
the MNE. Modifications in the discourse provide
important insights into how corporate and sub-
sidiary actors reconstruct the ongoing indepen-
dence–interdependence tensions that are at the
heart of the MNE. Thus these discourses can be seen
as essential parts of the dialectics of discursive
struggles, in the sense that the resistance discourse
emerged as a local response to the selling discourse,
and the reconciliation discourse was then offered as
a solution to the struggle.
The identification of these three discourses is not
in itself surprising. These three discourses could be
considered to be typical of negotiations between
implementers and recipients of many change
interventions. However, our identification of how
these discourses unfold enables us to conceptualize
a process framework for the path of subsidiary
evolution at times of charter reduction. We find an
effective reconciliation in which the rebalancing of
global–local was accepted by both sides. Yet other
outcomes were possible. The process of “selling to
resistance to reconciliation” that we find may not
always take place. It would, for example, be possible
for resistance to foment without recognition,
building tensions that subvert MNE efforts at inte-
gration through loss of local input and distinctive-
ness. Thus here we focus on three main features of
our case that explain the particular process we
found.
First, the planning process was important in both
raising resistance and enabling its reconciliation.
The phased nature of the planning cycle, with its
specific dates and imposed deadlines for planning
meetings and brand campaigns (see Table 1),
created spaces in which the key protagonists could
come together to negotiate the tensions. Without
spaces in which discourses can unfold in a dialogic
process between the parties to a negotiation (Spee
& Jarzabkowski, 2010), the MNE selling discourse
may be seen as the legitimate voice, remaining
separate from the subsidiary voice, which is seen
as a subversive and hence illegitimate discourse
of resistance (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). However,
a structured process for MNE integration, such as a
Selling, resistance and reconciliation Julia Balogun et al
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meeting spaces in which the two voices can each
be heard. This enables the selling discourse to meet
the resistance discourse, enabling dialogic negotia-
tion to take place.
Second, our analysis shows how each party to
the dialogic process of negotiation is able to achieve
legitimacy for their discourse. In our case, the resis-
tance discourse was accompanied by the relative
power of the UK subsidiary, derived from their
expertise in planning for Brand X in their high-
revenue, more developed local market. This exper-
tise was the source of their subjective experience
of and resistance to the selling discourse. It also
provided them with legitimacy in resistance. Rather
than their discourses being illegitimate in the
context of the MNE corporate discourse of inte-
gration, their resistance was consistent with main-
taining MNE viability in larger, important local
markets as part of integration. While the subjectiv-
ity of losing their roles as planners might have
been seen as a normal outcome, occasioning
resistance, the more powerful argument that using
the new European campaign without adaptation
would harm the local success of the brand gave
legitimacy to the subsidiary discourse. Thus, when
the selling discourse met the resistance discourse,
each had a power base, so that there was reason for
negotiation to occur, rather than simply suppres-
sing the subsidiary voice.
Third, we show the importance of reconciliation
mechanisms in moving negotiations from resistance
to consensus. When different voices are engaged in
a dialogue, resolution is not necessarily the outcome
(Bakhtin, 1981; Vaara & Tienari, 2011). However, our
case featured recourse to both hierarchical and
expertise power-based forms of reconciliation. The
MD who arbitrated on the upward appeal could
not only appreciate and enforce the MNE corpo-
rate focus on integration, given his role as EMT
sponsor, but also, with local knowledge of the UK
market, respect the market-based appeals. Hence he
could support the rebalancing of MNE headquarter–
subsidiary interdependence–independence, enabling
each to discursively renegotiate its subjectivity suffi-
ciently to reach a discourse of reconciliation. As
ar e s u l t ,t h eE M Tw a st h e na b l et om o v eo nt om o r e
collaborative processes that recognized the impor-
tance of capturing local expertise.
The three discourses can be seen as essential parts
in a process of negotiations. We suggest that
negotiations can deliver reconciliation when there
are spaces for negotiation to occur, sufficient power
bases (albeit from different sources, for each
discourse to have legitimacy for the viability of
the MNE), and reconciliation mechanisms that can
accord respect to each voice. When this occurs,
discursive struggles can lead to a new legitimated
balance of power. Thus the process we uncover is in
itself a contribution to what we know about
subsidiary role development through a micro-
political perspective. It identifies features whose
presence or absence could alter the path and pace of
the selling, resistance and reconciliation discourses.
Without one or more of these features, the process
could be curtailed, or one phase, such as resistance,
could be protracted, or there might be a different
outcome. Therefore other studies might examine
the extent to which the three phases we found are
a typical and complete set of discourses, and under
what circumstances they are more or less enabled or
constrained. For example, we identify a particular
reconciliation mechanism. What other processes
and mechanisms would lead to effective reconci-
liation? Under what circumstances would these
mechanisms obstruct instead? We have also shown
how a discourse of resistance may achieve legiti-
macy. In what circumstances are there other dis-
courses of resistance that are perceived as legitimate
or illegitimate? Furthermore, our study explores
only one structural solution to the issue of integra-
tion across markets. What other paths and patterns
result from other structural solutions?
However, it should be noted that the three dis-
courses are not only phases in negotiations, but also
ways in which actors continuously make sense of
and give sense to subsidiary roles and the inter-
dependent-independent balance. Indeed, discourses
such as selling, resistance and reconciliation may
frequently coexist in MNEs as alternative and com-
peting ways of sensemaking (Vaara & Tienari, 2011).
Thus the discursive approach can help us to better
understand the complexities, ambiguities and con-
tradictions that often characterize HQ–subsidiary
relationships, and thus move research in this area
toward a more nuanced understanding of what goes
on in contemporary MNEs.
Implications and Conclusion
Our analysis makes three contributions to IB resea-
rch. First, our analysis of selling, resistance and
reconciliation discourses contributes to research on
subsidiary role evolution by enabling us to move
beyond a simplistic model of headquarters control
and subsidiary resistance. Prior research recognizes
that subsidiary managers have the potential to take
Selling, resistance and reconciliation Julia Balogun et al
782
Journal of International Business Studiesinitiative, but these managers are usually seen as
acting for the “greater good” of the MNE or then
expected to simply maximize the autonomy of the
subsidiary (Andersson et al., 2007; Bouquet &
Birkinshaw, 2008a, 2008b; Clark & Geppert, 2011;
Do ¨rrenba ¨cher & Geppert, 2006). Alignment bet-
ween centre and subsidiary is considered “good”
and misalignment as “dysfunctional,” and some-
thing to be suppressed. Our findings challenge such
a view by pointing out that negotiations often
involve both resistance and attempts at reconcilia-
tion. Resistance from misalignment is, in fact,
important in its own right. It may stem from the
threat to subjectivity that a change such as charter
reduction imposes on the people involved, but
it may also have ramifications for some of the
value-adding elements of local markets. It is thus
important to recognize that negotiations may and
should lead to compromise, rather than being seen
as a threat to central authority and something to be
avoided. Nor is such acceptance immediate. It can
come about only through a negotiation process
involving discursive struggles that allow both
parties to reconstruct their subjectivities about the
change and their new roles within the MNE.
Instead of finding resistance to change to be
illegitimate and subversive, as is typical in more
functionalist studies of change (Balogun, Bartunek,
& Do, 2010; Ford, Ford, & D’Amelio, 2008; Thomas,
Sargent, & Hardy, 2011), our analysis helps us
understand that resistance can at times be both
legitimate and beneficial, given the different
knowledge bases of MNE and subsidiary managers.
Geppert and Williams (2006) and others (e.g.,
Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998a; Clark & Geppert, 2011)
indicate that subsidiary power is enhanced by
certain host-country factors, such as a strategic
position and economic performance that render
them important, alongside an institutional embed-
dedness in their local country that accords them
greater independence of practices and authority.
These influences might increase autonomy and
independence, and hence exacerbate tension with
the interdependent strategic approach of the MNE.
We elaborate and extend this analysis by showing
how these influences are grounded not just in
perceptions of power and resistance, but in the way
that powerful subsidiaries discursively construct the
local market and the degree of interdependence
that they perceive as appropriate for the viability of
their local market. They affect what MNEs and
subsidiaries can and cannot do. The negotiations
uncovered here were not just due to the fact that
the UK could extract some degree of concessions
given its economic importance, but also due to the
fact that the team genuinely believed that there
were differences in local market conditions and
expertise in dealing with them. Without resistance,
knowledge of benefit to the MNE would not be
revealed, and accommodation could not take place.
MNE executives need to make a judgment as to
when opposition to change is self-interest-based
“resistance,” and when it is legitimate and in the
best interests of the wider MNE. Thus MNE–sub-
sidiary negotiations at times of charter change are
likely to involve context-specific judgment calls,
concessions, new initiatives and other kinds of
negotiation tactics, the importance of which has
not yet been recognized in research in this area.
Once we move beyond a rationalistic model for
MNE–subsidiary relationships, there are many
motivations for subsidiary managers’ actions that
may have consequences for these relationships. Our
discursive approach provides a way to unpack and
explore alternative approaches to MNE–subsidiary
relationships.
A second contribution is that our focus on sub-
jectivity adds to research on “voice” in subsidiaries.
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008a) argue that voice
is a bottom-up relational process that enables a
subsidiary to emphasize existing or potential con-
tributions, which they conceptualize in terms of
subsidiary initiative taking and profile building.
Our analysis extends this perspective in three ways.
First, it shows the concept of voice to be both
a bottom-up and a top-down process at times of
change, since levels of subsidiary voice (such as
over their local strategy) need to be renegotiated.
Second, our analysis shows how voice is actually
exercised through particular kinds of rhetorical
tactics and strategies. Third, by examining the
construction of subjectivity through discourse,
our analysis explains how specific discourses enable
or constrain the exercise of voice. In our case, the
EMT’s selling discourse supported their authority
position but reduced the subjectivity of the local
managers. At the same time, the local managers
needed to resist the imposed changes to protect
their voice as locally autonomous actors. Hence
their alternative discourse drew from and empha-
sized their subject position as local experts. Thus
their voice was both a way to protect their position
and reestablish their influence.
Third, our analysis demonstrates the usefulness of
critical discursive analysis for IB research, especially
in the case of research on MNEs. We believe that
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because it has the potential to shed more light on
the central role of language in internationalization
and globalization, which is something that is still
poorly understood. In particular, critical discursive
analysis can elucidate the linkages between dis-
cursive and other social and material practices, and
thus place discourse in its context. Furthermore,
because of its critical orientation, it can comple-
ment existing IB research that is characterized by
rationalistic and managerialist analyses. While such
studies can focus on a detailed analysis of specific
texts (Vaara & Tienari, 2004, 2008), we wish to
speak for studies that examine the role of discourse
as part of organizational change. Such studies are
demanding, because they require a combination of
discourse analysis with processual organizational
analysis, but they can lead to a more dynamic
understanding of a range of issues is IB research.
However, not all language-related analysis needs to
be critical discursive analysis. For example, narra-
tive (Søderberg, 2006) or semiotic (Brannen, 2004)
analyses have proved to be very useful approaches
for IB researchers. It should also be noted that cri-
tical discursive analysis involves important require-
ments that should be respected: a genuine critical
orientation (e.g., interest in power or inequality),
an in-depth analysis of textual material and an
ability to take the social context seriously.
The overarching objective of this study has
been to deepen our understanding of subsidiary
role evolution. Tensions between independence
and interdependence are inherent in MNEs. Explor-
ing how these tensions are negotiated at times of
subsidiary charter change is a fundamental part
of understanding subsidiary role evolution. We
emphasize that these tensions do not have to
be portrayed as “either or” choices resulting in
winners and losers, as typically presented in exist-
ing literature. Rather, they can lead to “both and”
solutions. Furthermore, resistance does not always
have to be considered illegitimate, but can be
regarded as a natural part of the unfolding
negotiation of subsidiary roles. A critical discursive
perspective can help us to pursue this broader
perspective, and unpack issues to do with power,
politics, resistance and voice. In particular, it can be
used to reveal a nuanced picture of the complex
ways in which discourses socially construct the
MNE and the role of the subsidiary, how specific
rhetorical arguments are used in these discourses,
how discourses construct subjectivities, and the
organizational power implications that easily pass
unnoticed with more conventional approaches.
Our empirical analysis has been theory-building
in nature, but caution should be exercised when
generalizing the results. In particular, the findings
are restricted to situations of charter reduction
following a shift in MNE strategy, and how this
affects important country-based subsidiaries. While
this is likely to be a typical outcome for at least
some subsidiaries in any MNE strategy aimed at
greater integration, more research is required to
establish how a discourse perspective can more
generally inform what we know about the nature of
the negotiations that result from subsidiary role
development in different circumstances, and the
outcomes achieved.
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